turned the wrong way, with regard to every man born into the world? Can you see no difficulty in this? And can you find any way to solve that difficulty, but to say with the Psalmist. We were "shapen in iniquity, and in sin did our mothers conceive" us?

SECTION VIII.

OF ORIGINAL RIGHTEOUSNESS.

"ORIGINAL righteousness is said to be, 'that moral rectitude in which Adam was created. His reason was clear; and sense, appetite, and, passion were subject to it. His judgment was uncorrupted, and his will had a constant propensity to holiness. He had a supreme love to his Creator, a fear of offending him, and a readiness to do his will.' When Adam sinned, he lost this moral rectitude, this image of God in which he was created; in consequence of which all his posterity come into the world destitute of that image." (Pages 147-149.)

In order to remove this mistake, you re-consider some of the texts on which it is grounded: "Lie not one to another, seeing ye have put off the old man with his deeds; and have put on the new man, which is renewed in knowledge, after the image of him that created him." (Col. iii. 9, 10.) "That ye put off concerning the former conversation the old man, which is corrupt according to the deceitful lusts; and be renewed in the spirit of your mind; and put on the new man, which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness." (Ephesians iv. 22-24.)

On this, you affirm : "'The old' and 'new man,' here do not signify a course of life; but the 'old man' signifies the heathen, the 'new man,' the Christian, profession." (Pages 150, 151.)

This you prove, 1. From Eph. ii. 15: "Christ abolished the enmity, to make" (or create) "in himself of twain one new man." Does this only mean one new profession? It evidently means one Church, both of Jews and Gentiles.

You prove it, 2. From Col. iii. 8-12; where "the Apostle tells the Colossian Christians, that 'now' they were obliged to 'put off anger,' and 'to put on bowels of mercies;' to admit the Christian spirit into their hearts, and to practise Christian duties; for this reason, because they 'had put off the old man,' and ' had put on the new.' This shows ' the new man' was something they might have ' put on,' and yet be defective in personal, internal holiness." True; defective so far, as still to want more; more " bowels of mercies, meekness, long-suffering." But this does not show, that the "new man" does not mean the principle both of internal and external holiness. The consciousness of having received this is a strong motive both to depart from evil, and to labour after a continual increase of every holy and heavenly temper; therefore, here likewise, "the putting off the old and the putting on the new man" does not mean an outward profession, but a real, inward change; a renewal of soul " in righteousness and true holiness."

You prove it, 3. From Eph. iv. 22, 24: "Here," you say, "he considers 'the putting off the old ' and ' putting on the new man' as a duty. They had done it by profession, and therefore were obliged to do it effectually." They had done it effectually. So the whole tenor of the Apostle's words implies: "Ye have not so learned Christ; if so be," rather, seeing that, "ye have been taught by him ;—that ye put off the old man; —and be renewed in the spirit of your mind ;—and that ye put on the new man, which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness." (Eph. iv. 20–24.) The Apostle here manifestly speaks, not of a lesson they had not learned, but of one which God had taught them already; and thence exhorts them to walk worthy of the blessing they had received, to be "holy in all manner of conversation."

But, 4. "'The putting on the new man' is one thing, and the creating him' is another. He must first be created, and then put on." (Page 152.) No; he is created and put on at the same time; the former word more directly referring to God, who creates, the latter to man, who is created. "But God," you say, "'created the new man,' when he erected the gospel dispensation, as appears from Eph. ii. 15, 19–22." I answer: (1.) If those latter verses are explanatory of that expression, "one new man," in the 15th, then it does not mean one outward profession, but the one Church of living believers in Christ. (2.) The expression in the 15th verse is not the same with what we are now considering. Neither is the meaning of that and this expression the same : "One new man means one Church, and nothing else;" "the new man" means quite another thing,—the work of God in every individual believer.

You say, 5. "'The old man and the new,' and 'the new man's being renewed and created,' and the 'renewing' of the Ephesians, all refer, not to any corruption of nature, but to their late wicked life." (Page 153.) What? Does their being "renewed in the spirit of their mind" refer only to their wicked life? If you had not affirmed this, I should really wonder at your affirming quickly after, "In all other places of Scripture, except 2 Cor. iv. 16, 'renewing' relates only to a vicious course of life;" (Page 154;) seeing you immediately confute yourself by both the following citations :--- "Be not conformed to this world, but be ye transformed by the renewal of your mind:" (Rom. xii. 2 :) Unless the mind be only another expression for "a vicious course of life." "We ourselves also were sometimes foolish, disobedient, deceived, serving divers lusts and pleasures; living in malice and envy, hateful, and hating one another." (Titus iii. 3-5.) Do these words imply nothing but "a vicious course of life?" no inward corruption at all? ""But after that the lovingkindness and love of God our Saviour toward man appeared,-He saved us by the renewing of the Holy Ghost." From what? from a vicious course of life only? Nay, but from "foolishness" of heart also; from error, from malice, hatred, envy, evil desire; all which are inward corruptions.

You add: "From all this we may gather, that 'God's creating the new man after his own image in righteousness and true holiness,' means his erecting the Christian Church with a view to promote righteousness and holiness among men. For 'we are God's workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works.'" (Page 155.) Surely you do not cite this verse also to prove, that the "renewing of our mind" implies no inward change! It must be something more than an outward profession, or the reforming a vicious course of life, by reason of which we are said to be "God's workmanship, created anew in Christ Jesus."

These texts, therefore, do manifestly refer to personal, internal holiness; and clearly prove, that this is the chief part of that "image of God" in which man was originally created.

The other text which you re-consider, is Eccles. vii. 29: "God hath made man upright; but they have sought out many inventions." (Pages 156-160.) But this, you say, does not mean, that God made man righteous; but that he made him right, as having those powers, means, and encouragements, by a due use of which he may become righteous. In order to prove that this is the true meaning of the words, you affirm, 1. "That man here is not to be understood of Adam, but of all mankind." This cannot be granted without full proof. You affirm, 2. "This appears from the latter part of the sentence : ' They sought out many inventions.'" Adam and Eve did so, in and after their fall. This, therefore, proves nothing. You affirm, 3. "The word jashar" (which we translate upright) " does not always imply uprightness or righteousness." But this is its proper meaning, as will appear to any who seriously considers the following texts :-1. "When thou shalt do that which is right in the sight of the Lord." (Deut. xii. 25.) It is taken in the very same sense, verse 28; xiii. 18, and xxi. 9. In all these texts, it undeniably implies, morally good, or righteous. 2. "A God of truth and without iniquity ; just and right is he." (Deut. xxxii. 4.) "Good and upright is the Lord." (Psalm xxv. 8.) 3. "The word of the Lord is right." (Psalm xxxiii. 4.) "The ways of the Lord are right." (Hosea xiv. 9.) 4. "Be glad and rejoice, ye righteous." (Psalm xxxii. 11.) "Rejoice in the Lord, O ye righteous." (Psalm xxxiii. 1.) In the very same sense it occurs in numberless places. As the word is therefore properly applied to God himself, to his word, his providences, and his people, (in all which cases it must necessarily mean righteous.) we cannot lightly depart from this its proper signification.

But you think there is a necessity of departing from it here; because "to say, God created Adam righteous, is to affirm a contradiction, or what is inconsistent with the very nature of righteousness. For a righteousness wrought in him without his knowledge or consent, would have been no righteousness at all." (Page 161.) You may call it by any name you like better. But we must use the old name still; as being persuaded that the love of God, governing the senses, appetites, and passions, however or whenever it is wrought in the soul, is true, essential righteousness.

Nay, "righteousness is right action." Indeed it is not. Here (as we said before) is your fundamental mistake. It is a right state of mind; which differs from right action, as the cause does from the effect. Righteousness is, properly and directly, a right temper or disposition of mind, or a complex of all right tempers. For want of observing this, you say, "Adam could not act before he was created. Therefore he must exist, and use his intellectual powers, before he could be righteous." "But, according to this reasoning," as Dr. Jennings observes, "Christ could not be righteous at his birth." You answer, "He existed before he was made flesh." I reply, He did,—as God. But the man Christ Jesus did not. Neither, therefore, did he use his intellectual powers. According to your reasoning, then, the man Christ Jesus could not be righteous at his birth.

The Doctor adds : "Nay, according to this reasoning, God could not be righteous from eternity? because he must exist before he was righteous." (Jennings's Vindication.) You answer: "My reasoning would hold even with respect to God, were it true that he ever did begin to exist. But neither the existence nor the holiness of God was prior to each other." (Taylor's Supplement, p. 162.) Nay, but if his existence was not prior to his holiness, if he did not exist before he was holy, your assertion, that every being must exist before it is righteous, is not true.

Besides, (to pursue your reasoning a little farther,) if "God did always exist," yet unless you can prove that he always acted, it will not clear your argument. For let him exist millions of ages, he could not be righteous (according to your maxim) before he acted right.

One word more on this article: You say, "My reasoning would hold good, even with respect to God, were it true that he ever did begin to exist." Then I ask concerning the Son of God, Did he ever begin to exist? If he did not, he is the one, eternal God; (for there cannot be two eternals;) if he did, and your reasoning hold good, when he began to exist he was not righteous.

"But St. John saith, 'He that doeth righteousness is righteous.'" Yes, it appears he is, by his doing or practising "righteousness." "But where doth the Scripture speak one word of a righteousness infused into us?" Where it speaks of "the love of God" (the essence of righteousness) "shed abroad in our hearts."

And cannot God, by his almighty power, infuse any good tempers into us? You answer, "No;—no being whatever can do for us that which cannot be at all if it be not our own choice, and the effect of our own industry and exercise. But all good tempers are the effect of our own industry and exercise; otherwise they cannot be at all." Nay, then, it is certain they cannot be at all. For neither lowliness, meekness, long-suffering, nor any other good temper, can ever be the effect of my own industry and exercise. But I verily believe they may be the effect of God's Spirit, working in me whatsoever pleaseth him. See Isaiah xxvi. 12.

You add: "The thing cannot exist, unless we choose; because our choosing to do what is right, is the very thing which is to exist." No; the thing which is to exist is, a right state of mind. And it is certain, God can give this to any creature, at the very first moment of its existence. Nay, it may be questioned, whether God can create an intelligent being in any other state.

"But a habit is gained by repeated acts. Therefore, habits of righteousness could not be created in man." Mere playing upon words! He could be, he was, created full of love. Now, whether you call this a habit or no, it is the sum of all righteousness.

"But this love is either under the government of my will, or it is not." It is. The love of God which Adam enjoyed was under the government of his will. "But if so, it could be righteous only so far as applied to right action in heart and life." (Pages 164, 165.) Stop here. The love of God is righteousness, the moment it exists in any soul; and it must exist before it can be applied to action. Accordingly, it was righteousness in Adam the moment he was created. And yet he had a power either to follow the dictates of that love, (in which case his righteousness would have endured for ever,) or to act contrary thereto; but love was righteousness still, though it was not irresistible.

"I might add, Adam's inclination to sin (for he could not sin without a sinful inclination) must be so strong as to overcome his (supposed) inbred propensity to holiness; and so malignant, as to expel that principle at once, and totally. Consequently, the supposed original righteousness was consistent with a sinful propensity, vastly stronger and more malignant than ever was or can be in any of his posterity; who cannot sin against such resistance, or with such dreadful consequences. Thus, original righteousness in Adam proves far worse than original sin in his posterity." (Page 166.)

I have set down your argnment at large, that it may appear in its full strength. Now, let us view it more closely: "Adam

cculd not sin without a sinful inclination." The sentence is ambiguous. Either it may mean, "Adam could not choose ill, without some sinful temper preceding ;" and in this sense it is false; or, "He could not commit outward sin, without first inclining, that is, choosing so to do." 2. "This his sinful inclination (or temper) was so strong as to overcome his inbred propensity to holiness." It was not any sinful inclination (in this sense) which overcame his propensity to holiness; but strong temptation from without: How strong we know not, and the circumstances of it we know not. 3. "This his sinful inclination was so malignant, as to expel that principle at once, and totally." Not by any sinful inclination, but by vielding to temptation, he did lose the love and image of God. But that this was totally and at once, we have no authority to affirm. 4. "Consequently, original righteousness in Adam was consistent with a sinful propensity, vastly stronger, and more malignant, than ever was or can be in any of his posterity."/ It was consistent with no sinful propensity at all, but barely with a power of yielding to temptation. It declined in the same proportion, and by the same degrees, as he did actually vield to this. And when he had vielded entirely, and eaten the fruit, original righteousness was no more. Therefore, the Fifth proposition, "Thus original righteousness proves to be far worse than original sin," is flourish. What a figure does this fair argument make, now it is turned inside out !

From all this it may appear, that the doctrine of original righteousness (as well as that of original sin) hath a firm foundation in Scripture, as well as in the attributes of a wise, holy, and gracious God.

As you do not offer any new argument in your conclusion, I need not spend any time upon it.

You subjoin Remarks on Dr. Watts's Additions to his book. Some of these deserve a serious consideration :---

1. Either the new-created man loved God supremely, or not. If he did not, he was not innocent; since the very law and light of nature require such a love to God. If he did, he stood disposed for every act of obedience. And this is true holiness of heart.

You answer, (in many words,) "The new-created man did not love God supremely. For, before he could love God, the powers of his mind must have been quite finished, and actually exercised." (Page 186.) And, doubtless, the very moment he was created, they were quite finished, and actually exercised too. For man was not gradually formed by God, as a statue is by a human artificer; but "He spake the word, and they were made; He commanded, and they were created." And as light and heat were not subsequent to the creation of the sun, but began to exist with it, so that the moment it existed it shone; so spiritual light and heat, knowledge and love, were not subsequent to the creation of man, but they began to exist together with him. The moment he existed, he knew and loved.

2. If the new-made creature $h \cdot d$ not a propensity to love and obey God, but was in a state of mere indifference to good or evil, then his being put into such an union with flesh and blood, among a thousand temptations, would have been an over-balance on the side of vice. But our reason can never suppose, that God, the wise, just, and good, would have placed a new-made creature in such a situation.

This argument cannot be answered, unless it can be showed, either, (1.) That in such a situation, there would not have been an over-balance on the side of vice; or, (2.) That to place a new-made creature in a situation where there was such an over-balance, was consistent with the wisdom, justice, and goodness of God.

But, instead of showing, or even attempting to show, this, you feebly say, "I do not think the reason of man by any means sufficient to direct God, in what state to make moral agents." (O that you had always thought so ! How much vain, yea, mischievous, reasoning had then been spared!) "But, however Adam's propensities and temptations were balanced, he had freedom to choose evil as well as good." (Pages 187, 188.) He had. But this is no answer to the argument, which, like the former, remains in its full force. How could a wise, just, and good God place his creature in such a state as that the scale of evil should preponderate? Although it be allowed, he is, in a measure, free still; the other scale does not "fly up, and kick the beam."

3. Notwithstanding all the cavils which have been raised, yet if those two texts (Eph. iv. 24; Col. iii. 10) are considered together, their obvious meaning will strike an honest and unbiassed reader, the new man, or the principle of true religion in the heart, is created by God ofter his moral image, in that righteousness and true holiness wherein man was at first created.

You answer, "I have endeavoured to prove the contrary; and he does not offer to point out any one mistake in my interpretations." (Page 189.) I have pointed out more than one.

4. If these are the qualifications with which such a newmade creature should be endued; and these the circumstances, wherein, from the wisdom, justice, and goodness of God, we should expect him to be situated; then, by a careful survey of what man is now, compared with what he should be, we may casely determine, whether man is at present such a creature as the great and blessed God made him at first.

You answer in abundance of words, the sum of which is this: "Our circumstances are, on the whole, far better than Adam's were; for he was under that severe law, 'Transgress and die.'" (Page 190.) He was so; but this does not prove the point still; balancing this single disadvantage (if such it was; for even that may be disputed) with the numerous advantages he was possessed of, with the holiness and happiness which he enjoyed, and might have enjoyed for ever, it does by no means appear that the present circumstances of mankind in general are better than Adam's were.

5. God did not give Noah dominion over the brute creatures in so ample a manner as he did to Adam. Fear indeed fell on the brutes; but this does not sufficiently preserve man from their outrage. In the innocent state, no man would have been poisoned or torn by serpents or lions as now.

You answer: "The second grant runs,—' The fear of you and the dread of you shall be upon every beast of the field, and upon every fowl of the air, and upon all that moves on the earth, and upon all the fishes of the sea: Into your hands they are delivered. Every moving thing that liveth shall be meat for you: Even as the green herb I have given you all things.' Now, this grant is more extensive than the first." (Page 191.) It is, as to food; but not as to dominion. The liberty of eating an animal does not necessarily imply any dominion over it at all. " But the 'fear' and 'dread' of every beast are the effects of dominion in man, and the subjection in brutes." Nay, neither does *fear* necessarily imply dominion. I may fear what has not dominion over me, and what I am not subject to. And those animals may fear me, over which, nevertheless, I have not dominion, neither are they subject to me. I fear every viper, yea, every poisonous spider; and they fear me: Yet neither has dominion over the other. Fear, therefore, and dread may be in a high degree; and yet no dominion at all. But they are "'all delivered into our hands.'" Yes; "for meat;" as the very next words explain that expression. Whatever therefore it may "import in other scriptures," the meaning of it here is plain and certain.

6. Would God have exposed the pure and innocent works of his hands to such unavoidable perils and miseries as arise from bears, tigers, serpents, precipices, volcanoes, &c.?

You answer: "He did expose innocent Adam to a peril and misery greater than all these put together, even to a tempting devil." (Pages 191, 192.) I reply, (1.) This did not imply any unavoidable misery at all. (2.) It implied no more peril than God saw was needful, as a test of his obedience. Therefore this is no parallel case : So this argument also stands unanswered

7. It has been said, indeed, "If Adam fell into sin though he was innocent, then among a million of creatures every one might sin, though he was as innocent as Adam." (Pages 194, 195.) I answer, There is a possibility of the event; but the improbability of it is a million to one. I prove it thus: If a million of creatures were made in an equal probability to stand or fall; and if all the numbers, from one to one million inclusively, were set in a rank, it is plainly a million to one, that just any single proposed number of this multitude should fall. Now, the total sum is one of these numbers, that is, the last of them. Consequently, it is a million to one against the supposition, that the whole number of men should fall. And this argument will grow still ten thousand times stronger, if we suppose ten thousand millions to have lived since the creation.

Your argument stood thus: "If we cannot infer from Adam's transgression, that his nature was originally corrupt, neither can we infer from the transgressions of all mankind, that their nature is originally corrupt." It is answered, If a million of creatures were made in an equal probability to stand or fall, it is a million to one they should not all fall. You reply, "This is no answer to my argument." (Page 196.) Surely it is; and a direct answer. That one man sinned, does not prove he had a corrupt nature. Why? Because (supposing him free to choose good or evil) it was as probable he should sin, as not, there being no odds on one side or the other; but that all men should sin, does prove they have a corrupt nature; because it is not as probable, that all men should sin, as that one man should; the odds against it being as a million, or rather ten thousand millions, to one. Either, therefore, we must allow that mankind are more inclined to evil than to good, or we must maintain a supposition so highly improbable as comes very near a flat impossibility.

And thus much you yourself cannot but allow: "The reasoning may hold good, where all circumstances agree to make the probability equal with regard to every individual in this supposed million." And how can the probability be other than equal, if every individual be as wise and good as Adam? "But be it equal or no," you say, "the case is not to be estimated by the laws of equal probability, but of infection. For when sin is once entered into a body of men, it goes on, not according to the laws of chance," (is this precisely the same with equal probability?) " but the laws, as I may say, of infection." But how came sin to enter into a body of men? That is the very question. Supposing, first, a body of sinners, sin "may assume the nature of a contagion." But the difficulty lies against supposing any body of sinners at all. You say, indeed, "One sinner produces another, as the serpent drew in Eve : The first sin and sinner being like a 'little leaven which leavens the whole lump." All this I can understand, supposing our nature is inclined to evil. But if not, why does not one good man produce another, as naturally as one sinner produces another? And why does not righteousness spread as fast and as wide among mankind as wickedness? Why does not this "leaven, leaven the whole lump," as frequently, as readily, and as throughly, as the other? These laws of infection, so called, will therefore stand you in no stead. For, to bring the matter still more to a point, suppose Adam and Eve newly infected by sin; they had then none to infect, having no child. Afterward they repented, and found mercy. Then Cain was born. Now, surely neither Adam nor Eve would infect him, having suffered so severely for their own sin; which, therefore, they must needs guard hin, against! How, then, came he to be a sinner? "O, by his own choice; as Seth was righteous." Well; afterwards, both wicked Cain and good Seth begat sons and daughters. Now, was it not just as probable, one should infect his children with goodness,

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as the other with wickedness? How came, then, Cain to transmit vice, any more than Seth to transmit virtue? If you say, "Seth did transmit virtue; his posterity was virtuous until they mixed with the vicious offspring of Cain," I answer, (1.) How does that appear? How do you prove that all the posterity of Seth were virtuous? But, (2.) If they were, why did not this mixture amend the vicious, rather than corrupt the virtuous? If our nature is equally inclined to virtue and vice, vice is no more contagious than virtue. How, then, came it totally to prevail over virtue, so that "all flesh had corrupted themselves before the Lord?" Contagion and infection are nothing to the purpose; seeing they might propagate good as well as evil.

Let us go one step farther: Eight persons only were saved from the general deluge. We have reason to believe that four, at least, of these were persons truly virtuous.

How then came vice to have a majority again among the new inhabitants of the earth? Had the nature of man been inclined to neither, virtue must certainly have had as many votaries as vice. Nay, suppose man a reasonable creature, and supposing virtue to be agreeable to the highest reason, according to all the rules of probability, the majority of mankind must in every age have been on the side of virtue.

8. Some have reckoned up a large catalogue of the instances of divine goodness, and would make this as evident a proof that mankind stands in the favour of God, as all the other instances are of a universal degeneracy of man, and the anger of God against them. But it is easy to reply, The goodness of God may incline him to bestow a thousand bounties upon criminals; but his justice and goodness will not suffer him to inflict misery in such a universal manner, where there has been no sin to deserve it either in parents or children.

You answer: "There is more than enough sin among mankind, to deserve all the sufferings God inflicts upon them. And the Scriptures represent those sufferings as disciplinary, for correction and reformation." What, all the sufferings of all mankind? This can in nowise be allowed. Where do the Scriptures say, that all sufferings, those of infants in particular, are purely disciplinary, and intended only "for correction and reformation?" Neither can this be reconciled to matter of fact. How did the sufferings of Grecian or Roman infants tend to their correction and reformation? Neither do they tend to the correction or reformation of their parents, or of any other persons under heaven. And even as to adults: If universal suffering is a proof of universal sin, and universal sin could not take place unless men were naturally prone to evil, then the present sufferings of mankind are a clear and strong evidence that their nature is prone to evil.

9. Notwithstanding all God's provision for the good of man, still the Scripture represents men while they are in their fallen state, as destitute of God's favour, and without hope.

You answer: "How can men be destitute of God's favour, when he has vouchsafed them a Redeemer?" (Page 207.) By destitute of God's favour, we mean, children of wrath, objects of God's displeasure; and because they were so, the Redeemer was given, to reconcile them to God by his own blood; but, notwithstanding this, while we and they were in our fallen state, we were all objects of God's displeasure.

"But how can they be without hope, when he 'hath given them the hope of eternal life?'" All men who are not born again, born of God, are without hope at this day. God, indeed, "hath given," but they have not accepted, "the hope of eternal life." Hence the bulk of mankind are still as void of this hope, as are the beasts that perish. And so (the Scripture declares) are all men by nature, whatever difference grace may make. "By nature" all are "children of wrath, without hope, without God in the world."

10. Doth that man write the sincere sense of his own mind and conscience, who charges the expression, "Adam was on trial for us all," with this inference, "That we are none of us in a state of trial now, but Adam alone was upon trial for us all?" We have owned and granted, that men are now in a state of trial; but this is upon the foot of a new covenant.

You answer, "What can be more evident, than that, according to this scheme, Adam alone was to be upon trial for us all, and that none of Adam's posterity are upon personal trial?" (Page 209.) Do you not see the ambiguity in the word alone? Or do you see and dissemble it? Dr. Watts supposes, that Adam alone, that is, this single person, was on trial for all men. Does it follow from hence, that Adam alone, that is, no other person, was ever in a state of trial? Again: If no person but Adam was upon trial for all men, will it follow, "No person but Adam was upon trial at all?" It is really hard to think, that you here "speak the sincere sense of your own mind and conscience."

You go on : " He supposes all mankind are still under the original covenant with Adam, according to which he alone was upon trial for us all, and none of his posterity are upon personal trial." He does not suppose any man to be so under that covenant, as to supersede his being upon personal trial. Yourself add: "I knew he owned we are upon personal trial, and that all mankind are now under the covenant of grace; but how can either of these consist with the scheme?" Both of them consist with it perfectly well. (1.) Adam alone, or single, was, in some sense, on trial for all mankind, according to the tenor of the old covenant, "Do this and live." (2.) Adam fell, and hereby the sentence of death came on him and all his posterity. (3.) The new covenant was given, whereby all mankind were put into a state of personal trial; yet, still, (4.) Death, the penalty of the old covenant, came (more or less) on all mankind. Now, all this is well consistent with itself, as well as with the tenor of Scripture.

11. Mankind is represented as one collective body in several verses of the 5th chapter to the Romans.

You answer: "St. Paul always distinguishes between Adam, and all men, his posterity, and does not consider Adam with all men, as one creature." (Page 211.)

What then? This does not prove that he does not represent mankind (Adam's posterity) as one collective body.

12. All that is contained in the blessing given to Noah is consistent with the curse which came on all men by the first sin. But that curse is not consistent with the original blessing which was given to Adam.

You answer: "The blessing given to Noah was the very same which was given to Adam." (Page 212.) This is palpably false. The blessing which was given to Adam included, (1.) Freedom from pain and death. (2.) Dominion over the whole brute creation. But that given to Noah did not include either. Yet you affirm, "It is renewed to Noah, without any manner of alteration, after pain and death were introduced into the world!" And do pain and death then make no manner of alteration?

13. The dominion over the brutes given to Adam was not given to Noah.

You answer: "Our killing and feeding upon them is the

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highest instance of dominion over them." (Page 213.) It is no instance of it at all. I may shoot a bear, and then eat him; yet I have no dominion, unless it be over his carcase.

PART IV.

EXTRACTS FROM DR. WATTS AND MR. HEBDEN.

I HAVE now considered what is material in your "Doctrine of Original Sin," with the "Supplement, and Reply to Dr. Watts." And this I purposely did, before I read the Doctor's book. But how was I surprised on reading it, to observe the manner wherein you have treated it, of which I could not be a judge before! The frame which he had so beautifully and strongly connected, you have disjointed and broken in pieces, and given us nothing but mangled fragments of it, from which it is impossible to form any judgment of the whole. In order, therefore, to do justice to that great and good man, as well as to his argument, I subjoin an extract of so much of that work as directly affects the main question.

I the rather subjoin this, and the following extracts, for these two reasons: 1. Because what has gone before, being purely argumentative, is dry, and less profitable to the generality of readers: 2. Because they contain one uniform, connected scheme of the great doctrine which I have been hitherto defending; and which, after the objections have been removed out of the way, may be more clearly understood and firmly embraced.

INTRODUCTION.

"MAN is a creature made up of an animal body and a rational mind, so united as to act in a mutual correspondence, according to certain laws appointed by his Creator. Now, suppose the blessed God, who is perfect in wisdom and power, in justice and goodness, were to form such a new creature, with what qualifications may we conceive such a creature would be endowed, by a Being of such goodness, justice, and wisdom?" (Ruin and Recovery of Mankind, p. 1.)

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