

SECTION VI.

THE NOTION OF ADAM'S BEING A FEDERAL HEAD OR REPRESENTATIVE OF MANKIND CONSIDERED.*

MY reason for believing he was so, in some sense, is this: Christ was the representative of mankind, when God "laid on him the iniquities of us all, and he was wounded for our transgressions." But Adam was a type or figure of Christ; therefore, he was also, in some sense, our representative; in consequence of which, "all died" in him, as "in Christ all shall be made alive."

But as neither representative, nor federal head, are scripture words, it is not worth while to contend for them. The thing I mean is this: The state of all mankind did so far depend on Adam, that, by his fall, they all fell into sorrow, and pain, and death, spiritual and temporal. And all this is noways inconsistent with either the justice or goodness of God, provided all may recover through the Second Adam, whatever they lost through the first; nay, and recover it with unspeakable gain; since every additional temptation they feel, by that corruption of their nature which is antecedent to their choice, will, if conquered by grace, be a means of adding to that "exceeding and eternal weight of glory."

This single consideration totally removes all reflections on the divine justice or mercy, in making the state of all mankind so dependent on the behaviour of their common parent; for not one child of man finally loses thereby, unless by his own choice; and every one who "receives the grace of God in Christ," will be an unspeakable gainer. Who then has any reason to complain, even of having a nature inclined to evil? seeing the more opportunities he has of fighting, the more of conquering; and seeing, the greater is the difficulty of obtaining the victory, the brighter is the crown of glory.

But if Adam and Christ did not stand or fall, obey and suffer, for mankind, how can the death of others be the consequence of Adam's offence; the life of others, the consequence of Christ's obedience? How could all men be, in any sense, constituted sinners by the one, or constituted righteous by the other?

* Page 94.

To explain this a little further in Mr. Hervey's words: "By *federal head*, or *representative*, I mean, what the Apostle teaches, when he calls Christ, 'the Second Man,' and 'the last Adam.' (1 Cor. xv. 47.) *The last!* How? Not in a numerical sense; not in order of time: But in this respect,—that, as Adam was a public person, and acted in the stead of all mankind, so Christ, likewise, was a public person, and acted in behalf of all his people; that as Adam was the first general representative of mankind, Christ was the second and the last; (there never was, and never will be, any other;) that what they severally did in this capacity, was not intended to terminate in themselves, but to affect as many as they severally represented.

"This does not rest on a single text, but is established again and again in the same chapter. The divinely-wise Apostle, foreseeing the prejudices which men would entertain against this doctrine, as lying quite out of the road of reason's researches, has inculcated and re-inculcated this momentous point: 'Through the offence of one, many are dead;—the judgment was by one to condemnation;—by one man's offence death reigned by one;—by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation;' and that there may remain no possibility of mistaking his meaning, or eluding his argument, he adds, 'By one man's disobedience many were made sinners.' All these expressions demonstrate, that Adam (as well as Christ) was a representative of all mankind; and that what he did in this capacity did not terminate in himself, but affected all whom he represented."

After vehemently cavilling at the terms, you yourself allow the thing. You say, "If what was lost by 'the disobedience of one' person might afterward be recovered by 'the obedience' of another, then matters would have stood upon an equal footing." (Page 113.) And this is, indeed, the truth. For "all that was lost to us by Adam's 'disobedience' is fully recovered by Christ's 'obedience;' however we denominate the relation in which the one and the other stands to us."

In this we agree; but not in what follows: "By *law*, in the fifth of the Romans, as in several other places, the Apostle does not mean, barely a rule of duty; but such a rule, with the penalty of death threatened to every transgression of it. Such was the law given by Moses;" that is, "a rule, to every

transgression of which the penalty of death was threatened.* (Pages 114, 115.) Not so; there were a thousand transgressions of it, to which death was not threatened. Observe: By *death*, we now mean *temporal death*, according to the whole tenor of your argument. "But is it not said, 'Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things written in the law to do them?'" It is. But whatever this curse implied, it did not imply temporal death. For a man might neglect to do many "things written in the law," and yet not be punishable with death.

Neither can I agree with your interpretation of Rom. vii. 9: "'I was alive without the law once;' namely, before the giving of the law at Mount Sinai. The Jew was then alive; that is, because he was not then under the law, he was not slain by his sin. His sin was not so imputed to him as to subject him to death. 'But when the commandment came,' with the penalty of death annexed, 'sin revived,'—acquired full life and vigour,"—(How so? One would have expected just the contrary!) "'and I died;' that is, was a dead man in law, upon the first transgression I committed." (Page 116.) Beside many other objections to this strange interpretation, an obvious one is this: It supposes every transgression punishable with death. But this is a palpable mistake: Therefore, all that is built on this foundation falls to the ground at once.

Upon the whole: Whatever objections may lie against Dr. Watts's method of explaining it, it appears, from clear Scripture, and from your own words, that Adam was the representative of mankind.

SECTION VII.

OF THE FORMATION OF OUR NATURE IN THE WOMB.*

BEFORE I say anything on this head, I must premise, that there are a thousand circumstances relating to it, concerning which I can form no conception at all, but am utterly in the dark. I know not how my body was fashioned there; or when or how my soul was united to it: And it is far easier, in speak-

* Page 129.